Substitution


- a 'Virtual Freelance Informer' legal article from Roger Sinclair


 

> I'm an IT contractor working through my Limited Company, through an

> agency, providing services to an end-client.

>

> My contract with the agency has a clause allowing substitution with the

> client's approval.  In other words the right of substitution is

> fettered, and as I understand it the Revenue will see this (rightly or wrongly)

> as not a right to substitute at all.

 

As usual, what we need to do is to start from first principles.

 

1          The IR35 question is whether where

 

(a)       an individual ("the worker") personally performs, or is under an obligation personally to perform, services for the purposes of a business carried on by another person ("the client"),’.

 

(c)        the circumstances are such that, if the services were provided under a contract directly between the client and the worker, the worker would be regarded for income tax purposes as an employee of the client.’

 

(From Finance Act 2000, Schedule 12, para 1)

 

The obligation to provide personal service is an element of the 'irreducible minima' required to constitute a contract of service (ie an employment relationship) –

 

'the servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master.  [1]  

 

And if that obligation is not present, then the relationship cannot be of the employment type.

 

An obligation to provide services personally is one of the essential requirements for an employment relationship.  There are also other essential requirements, but for the moment we will stick with this one.  If you can show that this essential requirement is missing, then the relationship could not be employment – and so other considerations may adopt far less relevance from an IR35 viewpoint.

 

Thus the objective is to demonstrate that there is no obligation to provide the services personally.

 

The reason why substitution is seen by many as of such fundamental importance is that right on the part of the contractor to substitute is incompatible with a requirement to provide services personally.  It therefore follows that if there is a right to substitute, there cannot be a requirement for the Contractor to provide the services personally;  and as a consequence of that, the relationship could not be employment.  So Hey Presto!, we need look no further, are outside IR35.

 

2        The question then becomes one of whether or not the contract terms permit the individual to decide whether to perform the services (or any significant part of them) himself, or to have another do so.  If they do so permit him, then that undermines any suggestion that there is an obligation to perform them personally.

 

Where that right to decide is absolute, then we are probably home and dry.  It must still be implicit that the substitute has the necessary skills etc to perform the services however, even if not expressly stated.

 

It therefore follows (and this is supported by case law) that a right reserved to the client to first approve a substitute may not necessarily undermine the principle that the individual has the right to decide.

 

In Express and Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton [19991 ICR 693, although there was a right for the delivery driver to arrange

 

"at his own expense entirely for another suitable person to perform the services",

 

(which was held to be a crucial factor in deciding that the contract was not a contract of service), nevertheless a proviso that in such event

 

"the contractor must satisfy the company that such a relief driver is trained and is suitable to undertake the services",

 

was not considered to neutralise the point.

 

The question of whether the right to substitute is in fact ‘fettered’ is relevant to the more primary question of whether the Individual has the right to decide – that being the real question which needs to be addressed.

 

If the Client can refuse approval to a substitute only on reasonable grounds, relating to eg skills and suitability, then the right remains (to my mind) substantially unfettered.  I’d need to see your contract and to consider the apparent rights to substitution against the background (1) of the contract as a whole, and (2) the real world situation, before passing an opinion on your own position.  But I would not necessarily take for granted that a right is ‘fettered’ simply because the client’s approval is required.

 

3          The key point in all of this remains whether or not there is an obligation to provide the services personally – because if you can show that there is not such an obligation, then there are features in the relationship for IR35 purposes which mean that, whatever that relationship might be (were it direct), it could not be a contract for services.

 

The existence of a substantially unfettered right of substitution will generally demonstrate the absence of an obligation to provide the services personally – and thus achieve this end objective.

 

> I have gained approval from the client to use a substitute and the

> agency are happy with this to take place.  For the days when substitution takes

> place, I will get my timesheet signed as if it were me in the office. 

> The substitute will not get anything signed by my client.  The substitute's

> Limited Company will invoice my Limited Company and payment will be made

> according to the agreement between the two companies - we are using the

> PCG Direct Client - Supplier contract (the substitute will not be an

> employee of my company).

>

> My question is this:

>

> Does the fact that actual substitution has taken place, regardless of

> the form of the substitution clause in my contract, take the contract out of

> IR35?  I believe the answer is yes, as the fact that the client is

> allowing a person to perform my duties in my place, under existing contractual

> arrangements, must mean that I am not "obliged to personally perform the

> services".

 

Actual exercise of a right of substitution (where the substitute is paid by you, and you remain responsible for the substitute’s work) is the best proof that the apparent right in the agency-contractor contract is in fact genuine – something about which the IR are often suspicious.

 

And (as I think you will see from the above) the wording of the substitution clause is a means to an end, rather than an end on itself.  Indeed, if you actually substitute, that should be sufficient – regardless of what the contract says on the subject.

 

> Also, if an extension to the contract is negotiated, under exactly the

> same contractual terms, will this be outside IR35 as well, i.e. does the

> client consent for the substitute carry forward into the extension?

 

The real question is whether or not the right for you to decide continues – and thus continues to negative the question of any obligation to perform the services personally.

 

If it is in effect a variation to the existing contract, then that should follow.  If on the other hand it is a fresh contract (as is generally the case), then the question needs to be asked afresh – and although (in the absence of anything to the contrary) there may be strong grounds for suggesting that this consent carries forward, it would be wise to get express written agreement to that fact.

 

 

 

30th November 2001

 


I'd really appreciate your feedback on this FAQ - so mail me and tell me what you think of it, if it's been useful to you, or let me know of any specific problem you have where I may be able to help.

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[1] Ready Mixed Concrete South East Limited v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance 1968 QB