SYNAPTEK
LTD v GRAEME YOUNG (HMIT) (2003)
Ch D (Hart J) 27/2/2003
TAX - CIVIL PROCEDURE - COMMERCIAL LAW - EMPLOYMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR CASE TO REMITTED TO GENERAL
COMMISSIONERS : DISCRETION : FURTHER FINDINGS OF FACT : APPEALS BY WAY OF CASE
STATED : S.56 TAXES MANAGEMENT ACT 1970 : INADEQUATE STATEMENT OF CASE :
INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT : IR35 LEGISLATION : FINANCE ACT 2000 : PERSONAL
SERVICE COMPANIES : INCOME TAX AND NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS CHARGED ON
FEES PAID BY CLIENT : ARRANGEMENTS EQUIVALENT TO EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
: REG.6(1) SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS (INTERMEDIARIES) REGULATIONS 2000 :
S.4A SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS ACT 1992 : S.75 WELFARE REFORM
AND PENSIONS ACT 1999
In an
appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the General Commissioners
dismissing the appellant's appeal from the Inland Revenue that the
circumstances of arrangements between an individual providing services to a
company through a personal services company were such that had they taken the
form of a contract between the individual and the company then the individual
would be regarded as employed by the company, the court stood over the
appellant's application to remit the case for further findings of fact pending
determination of the appeal.
Synaptek's ('S') application for its case to be
remitted to the General Commissioners ('the commissioners') for the
commissioners further findings.
If successful, S's appeal by way of case stated
from a decision of the commissioners dismissing S's appeal from a decision of
the Inland Revenue ('the revenue') of 30 April 2001 would have to be adjourned.
Gordon Stutchbury ('G') was a software engineer
employed by S, which provided G's services to clients, including the
Government's IT Services Agency ('ITSA') and a company known as EDS.
The revenue decided that the circumstances of
the arrangement between G and EDS for the performance of services from 1 May
2000 to 29 October 2000 were such that they had taken the form of a contract
between G and EDS, so that G would be regarded as employed by EDS.
S's appeal to the commissioners was dismissed.
S's grounds for remission were: (i) the decision
that was under appeal was to the effect that G was to be regarded as employed
by EDS from 1 May 2000 to 29 October 2000.
The commissioners entirely overlooked the undisputed
evidence before them that the relationship between S and EDS commenced only on
1 September 2000, prior to which ITSA had fulfilled EDS' role; and (ii) the
case stated contained inadequate findings of fact concerning arguments to be
adduced on appeal on the substantive issues, such that it would be difficult
for a court properly to consider the issues of law.
HELD: (1) The respondent, ('HMIT')
accepted that G's services were provided to ITSA under relevant arrangements
from 1 May to 30 September 2000 when ITSA's work was transferred to EDS and
therefore there was a seamless transition as to the work carried out by G.
Accordingly, it was unnecessary to remit the
case to the commissioners in order to enable them to make a finding to that
effect.
The argument on appeal could proceed on the
basis that the relevant transfer of transactions did take place on 30 October.
The consequences of that were a matter for
argument.
(2) The authorities indicated that the nub of
the matter was the question whether a particular contract was a contract of
service or for services, which question warranted careful analysis and fine
distinctions, Hall v Lorimer (1994) STC 23 considered.
S's criticisms of the commissioners' findings of
fact could be grouped into three categories: (i) facts that one could see from
the case stated were alleged before the commissioners and where it was possible
to interpret their decision as having accepted the correctness of the fact
alleged.
It was possible to interpret the commissioners'
decision as having broadly accepted the factual allegations.
The commissioners only found it necessary to
distil from those allegations broad conclusions as found in the findings of
fact; (ii) allegations of fact where it was not clear whether the commissioners
accepted the factual allegations and such was not reflected in their findings.
Here, the court could not decide whether S's
points were good or not and therefore the question of remission had to be
decided once the court had decided the questions of constructions raised by S;
(iii) matters on which there was evidence before the commissioners but was not
expressed or recorded as contentions and no explicit findings of fact had been
made.
It was not appropriate to remit the case to the
commissioners for specific findings as to whether or not they had accepted such
evidence and if so what significance was attached to it.
Such points amounted to "nit-picking"
as per Scott J in Consolidated Goldfields plc v IRC (1990) STC 356.
(3) The court could understand S's dissatisfaction
with the way in which the commissioners had expressed their findings.
It was difficult, simply reading the findings
and the conclusion to understand on a first reading without looking at the
underlying legal materials entirely, to follow their reasoning.
Such difficulty was exacerbated by the
relatively exiguous nature of the findings made.
It might be that a court would reach the
conclusion that the commissioners' findings were to slender to permit any
rational conclusion.
However, this court had not reached that stage
yet.
The application to remit would not be dismissed
as it depended on the conclusion the court might reach on the question of
construction.
Application stood over pending determination of
appeal.
Conrad McDonnell instructed by Bond Pearce for S.
Clive Sheldon instructed by the Treasury Solicitor for HMIT.
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27/2/2003 EXTEMPORE (Unreported elsewhere) |
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Document
No. AC9200496 |
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Source: Lawtel http://www.lawtel.co.uk
, copyright acknowledged.